Bid-based Signal Control with All Passive Players

Abstract

In this paper, we present a realization of bid-based control strategy in which all drivers are modeled as passive players, and movement managers develop bidding strategies based on state-observer system principles. Their bidding strategies blend engineering attributes (length of dynamic queue, and number of turns since last win, which is analogous to delay) with economic attributes (the account balances of the movement managers). Movement managers bid for green time for their respective turning movements. Arriving motorists pay fees so the movement managers can bid for discharge slots. Movement managers pay the municipality what they bid when use of the intersections space is contested; otherwise, they pay a nominal fee. An intersection between two one-way streets has been used to test these ideas. To provide benchmarks against which to compare the results from bid-based control, a model of an actuated controller is employed. The results suggest that bid-based control strategy produces lower delay and cycle length distributions than those produced by actuated control strategy.