Two-Sided Matching for the U.S. Navy Detailing Process with Market Complication

Abstract

The U.S. Navy detailing process is the matching process for assigning Sailors to available billets. This paper studies a new two-sided matching process for the detailing process to reduce the number of detailers, simplify the assignment process, and increase the satisfaction of Sailors and Commands. We focus on two-sided matching with market complications such as married couples looking for related positions. The existence of stable matchings is established by assuming all couples have responsive preferences, which means the unilateral improvement of one partner?s job is considered beneficial for the couple as well. Based on its unique features and special requirements, we design a two-sided matching algorithm for the detailing process with the consideration of market complications including married couples, priority billets that must be filled, and high fill rate for Sailors. We believe that this algorithm deals with these market complications in an appropriate manner.