A dynamic pricing mechanism for P2P referral systems
Conference Paper, Proceedings of 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS '04), Vol. 3, pp. 1426 - 1427, July, 2004
Abstract
Most existing research on peer-to-peer systems focuses on protocol design. In this paper, we consider the issue of free riding in peer-to-peer referral systems. Free riders are agents that refuse either to answer a query or to give referrals. Free riding is detrimental to the system, since it may prevent requesters from finding high quality providers efficiently. To mitigate the issue of free riding, we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism to motivate the agents to behave rationally. Service providers learn appropriate prices of referrals and answers in order to maximize their payoffs through stochastic iterative learning algorithms.
BibTeX
@conference{Yu-2004-123045,author = {Bin Yu and Cuihong Li and M. P. Singh and K. Sycara},
title = {A dynamic pricing mechanism for P2P referral systems},
booktitle = {Proceedings of 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS '04)},
year = {2004},
month = {July},
volume = {3},
pages = {1426 - 1427},
}
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